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Abstract 
 
This paper studies equilibrium merging behavior in composite good industries. Component 
producers face the option to either merge with a similar component producer (horizontal merger) 
or a complementary one (complementary merger) of a composite good. Focusing only on 
strategic reasons, complementary mergers arise at equilibrium only when composite goods are 
very differentiated while horizontal mergers otherwise. Next, when efficiencies are considered, 
the level of marginal cost saving required for a horizontal merger in a composite industry to result 
in a non- increase in the upward price pressure index (UPPI) is greater as compared with the one 
in a regular industry. This result can be used by antitrust authorities to be more demanding when 
dealing with horizontal mergers in composite goods industries. 
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1 Introduction
Consumers derive utility from consumption of di¤erent sort of goods, some of them are
consumed separately and others used in combinations instead. There are combinations
in which individual components provide utility as well, such as a ight and a hotel book-
ing; while in others utility is only derived when both components are used simultaneously,
such as mobile phones and mobile phone services, hardware and software, printers and ink
cartridges or an e-book le and a device to read it. Industries involved in those products
are signicant for developed economies. For example the mobile phones market valued
at Retail Selling Price is worth 16,702 millions of dollars in North America and 37,765
millions of dollars in Western Europe in 2011. Consumer expenditure on telecommunica-
tions services is about 247,855 millions of dollars in North America and 242,323 millions
of dollars in Western Europe in 2012.1 Industries developing those products are typically
concentrated and rms are in constant search for increased protability. Then, interesting
questions raise: is it more protable for a component producer to merge with a substitute
or with a complement component producer? What will authorities do? Whats the role
of e¢ ciencies in these scenarios?
Note that the above question is interesting and also pertinent. The second merger in
deal value importance in 2012 is between Starburst II Inc (dependent from the Japanese
rm Softbank Corp, the acquirer) and Sprint Nextel Corporation (the target) and amounts
to 36,956 millions of dollars.2 Both rms o¤er wireless networks and mobile communica-
tion services. The proposed merger is therefore between substitute component producers,
while Starburst II Inc had potentially the option to merge with a mobile phone producer
such as the Japanese rm Kyocera, that is, with a complement component producer.
Then, it is relevant to understand which are the reasons behind the Starburst decision.
The main purpose of the paper is to analyze the equilibrium merging behavior in
composite good industries, that is when rms face the option to either merge with a com-
petitor that is producing a similar component (same type) or a complementary component
(di¤erent type) of a composite good. The rst type of merger will be denoted horizon-
tal merger, while the second one complementary merger.3 Mergers are useful devices to
1Data from Passport GMID by Euromonitor.
2Data from Zephyr Annual M&A Report 2012, published by BvD.
3Both types of merger are di¤erent from vertical mergers, which entail expanding forward or backward
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restructure industries4 and one of the most scrutinized rmsdecisions by competition
authorities. During 2012 the FTC has actively used litigation to block proposed mergers
and unwind allegedly anticompetitive consummated mergers, for instance in December
2012 the FTC led a complaint seeking to deter Integrated Device Technologys acquisi-
tion of PLX Technology in the hardware industry. Similarly, the recent DOJs challenge
to the Anheuser-Busch InBev/Grupo Modelo transaction in the beer industry. Regarding
the European Commission, over the past three years, the rate at which notied mergers
initiate a Phase II investigation has almost tripled, from 1.19% in 2010 to 3.53% in 2012.
Finally, 2012 witnessed the third (UPSs acquisition of TNT Express) fourth (the pro-
posed takeover of Aer Lingus by Ryanair) and fth (the merger between Deutsche Börse
and NYSE) merger prohibition since 2007.
However, while complementary mergers are pleasantly received, horizontal ones are
usually considered harmful for consumers and society.5 Thus our second purpose in the
paper is to provide some guidance to competition authorities to better understand the
e¤ects of horizontal mergers in composite good industries. In doing so, we will draw
comparisons on the UPPI (upward price pressure index) resulting from horizontal mergers
in the composite industry analyzed and those derived from regular industries. Also on
how synergies resulting from horizontal mergers a¤ect the UPPI depending on the good
considered.6
in the chain of distribution, toward the source of raw materials or toward the ultimate consumer. Settings
where complements are di¤erent inputs in a product chain and assembled by the producers describe
vertically related rms. But only one (the downstream end of the chain) has direct access to consumers.
In our case such a vertical relation does not exist.
4The number of mergers and acquisitions in 2012 reached 19,600 in Western Europe and 14,800 in
the US and Canada. Despite the worldwide economic crisis, the number of deals is still relevant (Zephyr
Annual M&A Report 2012, published by BvD).
5Nevertheless, horizontal mergers are frequently proposed and accepted by antitrust authorities. For
example, a merger between two of the six major publishing companies, Random House and Penguin
Group (Pearson) has been recently announced. It will reach a turnover of e3,000 million. The new rm,
Penguin Random House, has been approved by antitrust authorities from US, New Zealand, Australia,
EU, Canada, South Africa and China, all of them without conditions.
6Upward price pressure indices have recently been incorporated in merger analysis by Professors
Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro to evaluate potential unilateral e¤ects. In fact, the US Horizontal
Merger Guidelines issued in 2010 by the USDOJ and FTC are considering UPPI thresholds instead
of the 35 percent combined markets share threshold to assess unilateral e¤ects of horizontal mergers.
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To answer the above questions, we will present the simplest model that allows rms
to choose the type of merger. Then, consider an industry of composite goods formed
by two components, A and B. There are four independent rms, two of them produce
varieties of component A while the other two rms produce varieties of its complemen-
tary component B. Componentscompatibility results in four composite goods in the
market. We assume consumers choose components to create their own composite goods
and get utility, since consuming separate components is useless. Therefore, composite
goods compete as imperfect substitutes, but at the same time, di¤erent type components
are complements while same type components are substitutes. One of the four rms, the
proponent rm chooses between merging with a substitute component producer, with a
complementary component producer or remaining alone. Focusing on strategic e¤ects, we
nd that a complementary merger is privately preferred only when composite goods are
very di¤erentiated, the horizontal merger is chosen otherwise.7 Therefore horizontal merg-
ers are more suitable tools rather than complementary ones to increase business prots.
The Cournot e¤ect is dominated by the competition e¤ect. Regarding policy implications
we reach two interesting ones: i) when only strategic e¤ects are reckoned, proposed com-
plementary mergers have to be always cleared while proposed horizontal mergers must be
always forbidden by antitrust authorities. And ii) merger proposals di¤erent from the equi-
librium ones are su¢ cient conditions for antitrust agencies to infer substantial e¢ ciencies
not considered that justify those proposals.
If rms do the same activity, it seems natural to consider costs savings after a merger
due to the similarity in production of both components.8 Those e¢ ciencies are obtained
from the rationalization of production, economies of scale, technological progress (know-
However, market shares can be informative about diversion ratios. Antitrust authorities take into account
several instruments to evaluate the e¤ects of a merger, not only diversion ratios and market shares, but
also merger simulations and qualitative analysis of the elements that determine prices and aspects not
captured by other means, as is stated in Kühn, Albæk, and De la Mano (2011) for the DG Competition
in EU.
7Both mergers are qualitatively di¤erent, not only by the component combinations, but also because
the complementary merger allows more pricing strategies (pure bundling and mixed bundling).
8In the empirical paper by Gayle and Le (2013) two real mergers between airline companies are studied.
They found evidence of xed and marginal cost savings in both cases. In another industry, Harrison (2011)
found that hospital mergers involved cost savings, which are greater the rst post-merger year than the
following ones.
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how, R&D), purchasing economies or savings in factor prices.9 When e¢ ciency gains
are su¢ ciently large to extend the benets to consumers, antitrust authorities allow for
the proposed horizontal merger. Thus, which is this minimum required e¢ ciency in a
composite good industry? In order to answer this question the level of marginal cost
saving that results in a non-increase in the upward price pressure index is computed. We
nd that a greater marginal cost saving is required for a horizontal merger in a composite
good industry not to increase prices as compared with a horizontal merger in a regular
good industry. The above result is interesting for antitrust authorities since it advises
them to be more demanding when dealing with horizontal mergers in composite goods
industries. We would like to note that this di¤erence is rooted to the higher diversion
ratio and margin that arises in composite good industries.
The received literature
Analysis of merging incentives started with Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (SSR) (1983)
where exogenous mergers not including enough members could be unprotable for the
participants while outsiders were better o¤, if only strategic e¤ects are considered, with
substitute goods and quantity competition.10 Gaudet and Salant (1992) extend SSRs
analysis to complementary goods and price competition, getting the same conclusions
about merger protability but opposite welfare outcome. Beggs (1994) studies merging
decisions in a setting of two groups with two rms each, where products are comple-
ments within the group but substitutes across groups and no compatibility is assumed.
Complementary product rms usually prefer acting independently instead of merging.
Economides and Salop (1992) analyze price e¤ects derived from di¤erent exogenous mar-
ket structures in an industry with two brands for each compatible component and no
bundling strategies. E¤ects on prices show that di¤erent market structures internalize
vertical and horizontal externalities. Choi (2008) takes Economides and Salops frame-
work to study strategic motives to engage only in complementary mergers allowing for
mixed bundling, which is the optimal post-merger price strategy where the bundle price
is lower while component prices are higher.11 Our contribution to the merger literature
9For an exhaustive analysis about e¢ ciency gains from mergers see Röller et al (2001).
10In Deneckere and Davidson (1985) every merger is protable, due to upward-sloping reaction func-
tions. Kamien and Zang (1990) develop a two-stage game of endogenous mergers in a market with
homogenous products, nding that full monopolization of an industry is not the usual result.
11In the case consumers also obtain utility by consuming the components separately, Flores-Fillol and
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hinges on the case in which consumers assemble the components of composite goods and
only joint consumption yields utility. We wish to move a step forward by addressing the
incentives to merge when two types of merger are possible in the same industry: among
same type component producers or among di¤erent type ones.
The binomial mergers-e¢ ciency e¤ects is considered since Perry and Porter (1985)
who state that incentives to merge depend on two e¤ects: price increases and output
decreases. Allowing for a larger merged rm (with lower marginal cost) than previous
independent rms, the output reduction is softer than in SSR. Farrell and Shapiro (1990)
present internal e¢ ciencies where rms have di¤erent costs, showing that economies of
scale or learning e¤ects needed for a merger to decrease prices are greater the larger are the
market shares of the merging rms and the less elastic is industry demand.12 More recent
papers focus on dynamic models of endogenous mergers, as Motta and Vasconcelos (2005)
and Vasconcelos (2010), where a comparison is established between myopic and forward
looking antitrust authorities. The former paper shows that if e¢ ciencies are strong, prices
might be lower after the merger, even if some rms exit. The e¢ ciency o¤ence argument
cannot be sustained with forward looking antitrust authorities, since rival rms will engage
in a merger as well. The latter paper focuses on structural remedies in merger control,
which are not needed to implement the preferred market structure with forward looking
authorities but they are necessary for optimal decisions with myopic ones. Banal-Estañol
et al (2008) focus on questioning the realization of e¢ ciencies. If antitrust authorities take
them for granted, mistakes are found in both sides: approving welfare-reducing mergers
and blocking welfare-enhancing ones. Closer to our model is Motta (2004), who nds a
su¢ cient level of e¢ ciency gains for a horizontal merger to be benecial for consumers
when rms choose prices in a static framework. We extend it by analyzing a composite
good industry with di¤erentiated goods nding the required synergy which implies a non-
Moner-Colonques (2011) nd that merging is a dominant strategy with soft competition and incentives
to merge are higher if component demands are not too important.
12An extension to this model and Werden and Froebs (1998) but allowing for entry is Spector (2003)
who found that protable mergers with no technological synergies are harmful for consumers, regardless
of xed costs or entry conditions. E¢ ciencies and free-entry are also studied in Cabral (2003), who states
that a merger defense based on cost e¢ ciencies changes if post-merger entry is allowed, because there is
a more e¢ cient rm, but entry will be less likely since new rivals will face a tougher price competition.
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increase in prices and how it compares with a regular good industry.13
Next section describes the model and presents the type of merger which is preferable
from a private and a social point of view. In Section 3 the model is extended to include
e¢ ciencies in marginal cost, the UPPI that corresponds to the Horizontal merger in a
composite good industry is provided and compared with the one that would arise if the
industry would not be a composite good one. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a situation where consumers need to combine two complementary components,
A and B, in xed proportions on a one-to-one basis, to form a composite good because
they only get utility by consuming a composite good. The industry consists of four
initially independent rms14, two of them producing A-type components, rms i = 1; 2;
and the other two producing B-type components, rms j = 1; 2. It is assumed that any
component of one type is fully compatible with any other component of the di¤erent type,
that is, there is full compatibility and therefore up to four di¤erent composite goods can
be consumed, i.e. A1B1; A1B2; A2B1 A2B2.
Note that the underlying market is one where both substitute and complement com-
ponents are strategically linked, but consumers only choose among substitute composite
goods. The quantity consumed of composite good AiBj is denoted by Xij where subscript
ij; with ij = 11; 12; 21; 22; refers to the four composite goods mentioned above. The price
of component Ai is denoted by pi while the price of component Bj is denoted by qj where
i; j = 1; 2. Therefore, composite good or system ij is available at price sij = pi + qj. The
system of demand functions is obtained considering a representative consumer product
di¤erentiation model, with the following utility function: U = y+
P
8ij Xij 2
P
8ij X
2
ij 
(X11X12 + X11X21 + X11X22 + X12X21 + X12X22 + X21X22); where ; ;  > 0 are the
demand parameters in the model and y is the quantity of numeraire good consumed.
Utility maximization under the following budget constraint, I = y +
P
8ij sijXij leads to
13Another interesting contribution is that of Mialon (2013), she considers which is the most protable
way for a rm to bundle her own product with a complementary one, either by proposing a complementary
merger or by forming a strategic alliance. Di¤erent price strategies (mixed bundling, pure bundling and
no bundling) are compared, although e¢ ciencies are not considered.
14For a general analysis of a composite good industry but with n producers of each type, see Pardo-
García (2012).
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the next system of inverse demand functions, sij =  Xij  (Xii +Xji +Xjj) ; where
ij; ii; ji; jj = 11; 12; 21; 22; with ij 6= ii 6= ji 6= jj. Finally, by inverting the above system,
the next system of demand functions is reached,
Xij =
( ) (+2)sij+(sii+sji+sjj)
( )(+3) ; (1)
where ij; ii; ji; jj = 11; 12; 21; 22; and ij 6= ii 6= ji 6= jj:
Note that composite goods are imperfect substitutes, own e¤ects in demand are neg-
ative and greater, in absolute value, than cross e¤ects if condition  >  holds. This
condition is standard and simply says that an increase of the same amount in all prices
will imply a decrease in demand. Finally, as parameter  approaches ; composite goods
become more similar (less di¤erentiated) to consumers and in the extreme case where 
equals zero all goods become independent.
Regarding component production costs, and to simplify the model as much as possible,
it is assumed that marginal costs are constant, common and equal to c: Firms prots are,
therefore, Ai = (pi   c)(Xi1 +Xi2); and Bj = (qj   c)(X1j +X2j), for all i; j = 1; 2:
Without loss of generality, along the merger proposal A1 is arbitrarily chosen to be the
proposer, that is, the rm deciding whom to merge with. The other part, the respondent,
can either accept or reject it. If a proposed merger is protable as a whole, any respon-
dent will undoubtedly accept it, since the proposer will o¤er the same prots earned the
previous period plus an epsilon to the respondent. Only mergers that will be accepted at
equilibrium will be proposed.
Initial situation: Independent ownership (I)
Each rm is identied with a single component and its strategic behavior a¤ects the
marketing of two composite goods. Firms are assumed to maximize prots by choosing
corresponding prices and due to the assumed symmetry in the market, equilibrium prices
of every component are the same, as well as composite goods outputs and rmsprots.
The initial situation equilibrium (component prices, composite good outputs and rms
prots), denoted by superscript I; reads pIi = q
I
j = q
I = pI = ( )+c(+)
(3 ) ; 8i; j; XIij =
XI = ( 2c)(+)
(3 )(+3) ;8ij; : Quantities are nonnegative as it is assumed that   2c thus
prots are also positive and read IAi = 
I
Bj
= I = 2( 2c)
2( )(+)
(3 )2(+3) ; 8i; j.
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The Horizontal Merger (H)
Consider a merger between the two producers of the same type of components, e.g.
the A1A2 merger. The rms not participating in the merger are named as outsiders. The
new rm partially internalizes competition among composite goods by monopolizing one
type of component in the market. Equilibrium prices and outputs, denoted by superscript
H, are the following:
Prices Outputs
Merged rm
Outsiders
pH1 = p
H
2 = p
H = (+)+c( )
(3+)
qH1 = q
H
2 = q
H = ( )+c(+3)
(3+)
XHij = X
H = ( 2c)(+)
(3+)(+3)
; 8ij:
Components produced by the merged rm have a higher price as compared to the
initial situation. The reason is that the marginal benet is now larger at any price for the
new entity, thus leading to a higher equilibrium price which results in a lower equilibrium
price of the complementary components (by strategic substitutability among ps and qs).
Therefore, as compared with the initial situation, pH > pI = qI > qH . Equilibrium
outputs for all composite goods are set at the same level due to the symmetry, since the
merged rm produces components for every composite good in the market. Finally, the
increase in the A  type component price is greater than the decrease in the B  type
one, therefore composite good prices rise (i.e. sH > sI) while outputs decrease after
the merger. Thus consumers are worse o¤. Firms prots are HA1A2 =
4( 2c)2(+)2
(3+)2(+3)
and
HB1 = 
H
B2
= 2( 2c)
2( )(+)
(3+)2(+3)
:
Several comments are in order. First, the merged rm is better o¤ o¤ering the full
range of components rather than restricting them. The reason is that more composite
goods in the market allow the merged entity to capture greater share of industry prots,
at the expense of outsiders. Second, industry prots after the merger might decrease if
composite goods are very di¤erentiated (i.e. for 

< 2
p
3 3); the reason is that outsiders
prots after the merger fall to outweigh the increase in prots of the merged entity. As
products become more homogeneous all prots decrease, but the merger entity is able to
deal better with the increase in competition since it has more market power than rms
only controlling one component.
The Complementary Merger (C)
Consider now a merger between two di¤erent type component producers: e.g. the
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A1B1 merger. The merged rm is able to implement a mixed bundling pricing strat-
egy, that is it selects three prices p1; q1 and the bundle price sb; where at equilibrium,
sb < p1 + q1 = s11. The demand system must then be reformulated substituting s11 for
sb, as now composite good A1B1 is only demanded as a bundle, since it o¤ers a discount
on price.15 This implies that the merged rm now gets revenues from directly selling one
composite good (i.e. the bundle X11) and from the selling of two components which are
combined by consumers to form two mix-and-match composite goods (i.e. X12 and X21):
The other composite good, X22; is totally controlled by outsiders. However, it turns out
that when composite goods are not very di¤erentiated, mixed bundling can be improved
upon by the merged entity only focusing on the selling of the bundle and stops selling the
components A1 and B1 separately (i.e. pure bundling). This leads to the following result:
Result: The merged entity is better o¤ only selling the bundle when composite goods are
not very di¤erentiated (i.e. for 

> 0:665); otherwise mixed bundling arises at equilibrium.
The reason is that close substitutability among composite goods imposes at equilib-
rium too high component prices in order to keep the bundle appealing, thus ending up in
a situation where it is better not to serve the mix-and-match markets. Equilibrium prices
and outputs, where superscript C denotes complementary merger are:
Prices
Merged rm
sCb =
8<:
( )(3+5)+2(+)(3+)c
2(32+3 22) if


< 0:665
( )(3+2)+2(3+)c
2(32 2) if


> 0:665
pC1 = q
C
1 =
8<:
(+2)( )+(2++22)c
(32+3 22) if


< 0:665
not dened if 

> 0:665
Outsiders pC2 = q
C
2 =
8<:
( )(+)+(+3)c
(32+3 22) if


< 0:665
( )(2+)+2(+)c
2(32 2) if


> 0:665
15As noted by Tirole (2005): "buying the bundle is really the only feasible option if the prices of the
individual products are high".
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Outputs
Merged rm XC11 =
8<:
( 2c)(3+)(+2)
2(+3)(32+3 22) if


< 0:665
( 2c)(3+2)
2(+)(32 2) if


> 0:665
Outsiders XC22 =
8<:
( 2c)(22+5+52)
2(+3)(32+3 22) if


< 0:665
( 2c)(2+)
2(+)(32 2) if


> 0:665
Mix-and-match XC12 = X
C
21 =
8<:
( 2c)(22+3 2)
2(+3)(32+3 22) if


< 0:665
not dened if 

> 0:665
In the case of mixed bundling, outsider component prices decrease, while prices of the
components produced by the new entity are higher as compared with the initial situation.
Therefore, pC1 = q
C
1 > p
C
2 = q
C
2 : Both, the bundle price s
C
b and outsiders composite
good prices, are lower as compared with the initial situation. However, mix-and-match
composite goods increase their price. Thus, the general presumption that mergers between
complements lead to lower prices is not completely true. This happens because the merged
rm increases its single components prices to benet its bundle demand, pC1 + q
C
1 > s
C
b , in
detriment to mix-and-match systems demands. If we compare prices of composite goods
in the market after the merger, we nd that the bundle price is always the lowest one:
sC12 = s
C
21 > s
I > sC22 > s
C
b : As a consequence the outputs ranking is X
C
11 > X
C
22 > X
I >
XC12 = X
C
21: A result obtained by Choi (2008) which we qualify with the pure bundling
analysis.
In fact when pure bundling is used, for 

> 0:665; the strategic e¤ect is completely
twisted since sCb > s
C
22 > s
I . The unilateral e¤ect of a complementary merger is to
increase prices upon the initial situation, which is followed by another increase in outsider
prices ending up in a situation that harms consumers. Regarding prots, the merged rm
obtains higher prots than outsiders:
CA1B1 =
8<:
( 2c)2( )(+2)(172+30+2)
4(+3)(32+3 22)2 if


< 0:665
( 2c)2( )(32+22)
4(+)(32 2)2 if


> 0:665
CA2 = 
C
B2
=
8<:
2( 2c)2( )(+)3
(+3)(32+3 22)2 if


< 0:665
( 2c)2( )(2+)3
4(+)(32 2)2 if


> 0:665
Interestingly, industry prots decrease after the merger for 0:129 < 

< 0:750: The
reason is that the increase in prots realized by the new entity is more than compensated
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by the reduction of outsidersprots when the merged rm undertakes mixed bundling.
The new entitys strategic superiority (three strategic variables) is used to drain prots
from the outsiders composite good and the mix-and-match ones to the bundle. In fact
the new entity gets more prots with the selling of the bundle than the pre-merger prots
corresponding to the same composite good, i.e. (sCb   2c)XC11 > (pI + qI   2c)XI : This
prots increase su¢ ces to cover the reduction in prots coming from the mix-and-match
composite goods. At the same time, mixed bundling pricing imposes a negative external-
ity on outsiders, as they are compelled to reduce margins without getting a higher market
share. In the case the merged rm undertakes pure bundling, i.e. for 0:665 < 

< 0:750;
the same argument applies. But for 

> 0:750; the situation is reversed as either the
increase in the merged rm more than compensates the outsidersprots reduction when


< 0:908, or all rms see their prots increase.
Equilibrium merger (private solution)
Which merger will endogenously arise is the content of the next proposition.16
Proposition 1. The equilibrium merger that will arise in this market depends on how
di¤erentiated the composite goods are. The Complementary merger will be the equilib-
rium one if 0 <  < 0:0958; the Horizontal merger otherwise.
In Choi (2008) only complementary mergers are considered, however, when rms also
have the option to create a horizontal merger, the complementary one only arises for
a small range for parameter ; in the rest of the interval a merger between substitutes
is privately preferred. If  is close to zero composite goods are very di¤erentiated and
competition is not intense, thus the merged rm prefers to fully control one composite
good through a C merger. In this way the new entity benets from the so-called Cournot
e¤ect, the price reduction for two complements when they are sold by the same rm rather
than by separate monopolists. The merger leads to a reduction in both complement prices,
since the new rm captures the demand increase in the composite good when it lowers the
16The term ( 2c)2 is the scale parameter that can be sorted out when prots comparisons are made.
Also note that comparisons are driven by the ratio  ; thus setting  = 1; for the sake of simplicity, does
not alter the conclusions.
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other components price. As  increases, composite goods are less di¤erentiated and com-
petition is more intense. Prices are already rather low, so a merger between complements
makes prices decrease even more, and this makes the C merger less protable. Then it is
preferable to internalize the e¤ects of competition within substitutes by monopolizing one
component type. Therefore, the merged rm controls one component in every composite
good in the market, increasing its market power. The above argument works out even for
the case where the complementary merger implies pure bundling. Then, horizontal merg-
ers are those to be expected when only strategic reasons are in place. Horizontal mergers
are more suitable tools rather than Complementary ones to increase business prots. The
Cournot e¤ect is dominated by the competition e¤ect.
Socially optimal merger
Finally, to answer our initial research question, it is important to analyze whether the
proposed mergers arising from the previous subsection would be cleared by antitrust au-
thorities. Antitrust authorities make decisions based on how the proposed merger a¤ects
either Consumer Surplus (CS) or Social Welfare (SW) standards. To obtain the Social
Welfare measure we take the utility function and subtract the costs paid by rms. Then,
to obtain Consumer Surplus, we have to subtract the prots of all rms in the market to
the Social Welfare. The precise expressions can be found in the Appendix. To compare
SW and CS in both mergers, the same normalization as above is used. Which merger is
socially preferred is in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. The highest level of Social Welfare, which is a function of the degree
di¤erentiation, is attained as follows:
i) through a Complementary merger if 0 <  < 0:4090;
ii) or not clearing any type of merger if 0:4090 <  < 1:
Similarly, the highest level of Consumer Surplus is attained as follows:
i) through a Complementary merger if 0 <  < 0:6259;
ii) or by not clearing any type of merger if 0:6259 <  < 1:
After an H merger the new rm is the only producer of A-type components. Con-
sumers are worse o¤ because they have to pay a higher price for this type of component.
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This result generalizes to the case with more than two components of each type, where
the merged rm would partially monopolize the A-type component, since the same-type
outsiders will react by increasing prices. Although B-type producers react by decreas-
ing prices, the total e¤ect is that composite good prices are higher and outputs lower
in comparison to the initial situation. Even industry prots might fall when products
are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated. Thus the conclusion is clear: when only strategic e¤ects
considered, the H merger is never socially preferred. On the contrary, with a C merger
consumers can be better o¤ depending on how similar composite goods are perceived.
Only C mergers that undertake mixed bundling at equilibrium may attain the highest
consumer and total surplus. The new rm sets a bundle price lower than the composite
good price prior to the merger. In addition, the strategic reaction by outsiders leads
to outsider composite good prices decrease with respect to the initial situation. Finally,
mix-and-match composite goods have increased their price. Thus, it turns out that CS
is higher after the C merger if products are di¤erentiated enough, despite consumption
is diverted from the mix-and-match to the bundle and outsider composite goods. Ad-
ditionally, industry prots might decrease which explains why the clearing threshold is
more restrictive under the SW standard. The results about the C merger are partially
in line with those in Choi (2008), since at some threshold in the di¤erentiation parame-
ter, it is socially better not to engage in any merger. However, we have proven that C
mergers will not be typically proposed when rms have the option to engage inH mergers.
Policy Implications
In view of Propositions 1 and 2, there is a clear-cut policy implication regardless of
the standard considered: when only strategic e¤ects are reckoned, proposed C mergers
have to be always cleared while proposed H mergers must be always forbidden by antitrust
authorities.
Therefore, a market failure arises for 0:0958 <  < 1 since the proposed merger (a H
merger) would never be approved. In fact, two types of market failure can be considered,
one that implies a proposed merger type di¤erent to the socially optimal one (i.e. for
0:0958 <  < 0:4090 under the SW standard), and a second one that implies that no
merger is the social maximizing outcome. Finally, for  < 0:0958; when composite goods
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are very di¤erentiated, no market failure arises as any proposed C merger will be cleared.17
To complete the analysis let us think of a situation, which is usually the case, where
antitrust authorities have less information than rms involved in a merger. Then, if rms
submit a C merger proposal that is not expected at equilibrium, that is for  > 0:0958;
antitrust authorities should infer that this C merger will come out in cost e¢ ciencies and,
therefore, should be approved. This is a sign that the strategic incentives to merge have
being countervailed by e¢ ciency gains (such as production cost savings through economies
of scale and scope, improvements in quality or service, reductions in transactional costs
or increased incentives for R&D processes, and so on) anticipated by the rms which are
making the C merger more protable than a H one in that case. Since e¢ ciency gains
are good for consumers, antitrust authorities will be more willing to accept the proposed
merger. In other words, when rms propose a type of merger di¤erent from the equilibrium
one, authorities face cases where the e¢ ciency e¤ects obtained are substantial to make
that merger type preferable.
In the next Section, we analyze situations where rms involved in H mergers are able
to realize some sort of cost savings and we check the conditions for proposed H mergers
to be cleared.
3 Horizontal mergers with e¢ ciencies
Now the model is extended to include e¢ ciency e¤ects in case a merger between substitute
components occurs. Because the merging companiesbusiness operations may be very
similar, there may be opportunities to join certain operations, such as manufacturing
or advertising, and reduce costs. Obviously, cost savings could also be obtained in C
mergers, but we focus on the more interesting case since otherwise the conclusion would
17In this section we are considering myopic antitrust authorities. If forward looking antitrust authorities
were considered instead, they will not challenge mergers that are initially welfare reducing but that induce
a reaction of the outsiders ending up in a welfare increasing market structure. In Pardo-García (2012),
such kind of antitrust authorities is considered and the following conclusions are worth to mention. First,
the rms reaction after any merger, either horizontal or complementary, is that one of the outsiders
joins the initial merger instead of forming a counter-merger (the two outsiders merging too). Second,
welfare increases in any case. Therefore myopic authorities will challenge mergers that forward looking
authorities would not.
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be that C merger would be more frequently proposed and therefore cleared by antitrust
authorities.
Recent developments in merger enforcement place an important role, when consider-
ing the unilateral e¤ects of a merger, to the UPPI as an alternative way to assess merger
e¤ects on prices. The upward pricing pressure approach is easy to implement, it does not
rely on explicit market denition but instead relies on measures of product substitution
and can be especially relevant in a di¤erentiated products context. The price incentives
a merged rm faces after a horizontal merger of di¤erentiated products are of two kinds.
The rst one is driven by the internalization of competition between the two products
sold by the new entity and the second accounts for the potential cost e¢ ciencies derived
from the merger. The rst e¤ect is positive in the sense that it implies post-merger price
increases, while the second is negative since it works in the opposite direction. A post-
merger increase in prices would be expected only if the former e¤ect dominates the second.
In this section we will provide the UPPI that corresponds to the Horizontal merger in
a composite good industry and compare it with the one that would arise if the industry
would not be a composite good one.
The UPPI for a composite good market
To obtain the UPPI that corresponds to the composite good market analyzed above,
take the post-merger prot function and allow for e¢ ciencies in the form of synergies
a¤ecting marginal costs as follows: A1A2 = (p1   c)(X11 +X12) + (p2   c)(X21 +X22) +
Ec(X11+X12+X21+X22); where E stands for the merger induced marginal costs savings,
where E < 1. Then, we can easily compute the post-merger equilibrium prots arising
from prot maximization accounting for the e¤ect of synergies and denote them by pHs
and qHs; thus the price of composite goods is sHs = pHs+ qHs. Following Shapiro (2010b)
the UPPI is dened as the post-merger percentage increase for the composite good price,18
that is s
Hs sI
sI
: As indicated above, the UPPI is the sum of two terms, the rst is a function
of the diversion ratio19 from components A1 and A2, denoted by D12; and the pre-merger
18Despite rms select component prices the relevant price is the composite price and not the component
price since consumers do not derive any utility from consumption of single components. We will establish
their relationship below.
19The diversion ratio is not such a new concept. Shapiro (2010a) defends that economists have measured
diversion from one product to another using cross-elasticity of demand between two products, and agencies
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margin of a single component, denoted by M ; while the second term is the pass-through
rate which is a function of the marginal cost saving measured as a fraction of its price.
The diversion ratio D12 is dened as the share of sales lost by one merging component,
say component A1; that is recaptured by the other, component A2; when the price of the
former increases, that is D12 =
@(X21+X22)
@p1
@(X11+X12)
@p1
=   2
+
; where the demand of component A2 is
precisely X21 +X22 and that of component A1 is X11 +X12:20 Regarding the pre-merger
margin of a single component, M is dened as p
I c
pI
which is the same as the one resulting
for the composite good, s
I 2c
sI
; just noting that sI = 2pI by the symmetry considered.
We can express it as a function of the diversion ratio and other parameters as follows:
M = s
I 2c
sI
= p
I c
pI
= (1+D12)( 2c)
(1+D12)+c
: Finally the UPPI that arises is given by
sHs   sI
sI
=
1
2
(
pHs   pI
pI
+
qHs   qI
qI
) =  M D12
2(3 +D12)(1 +D12)
  (1 M)E
2(3 +D12)
: (2)
Which equals the average UPPI of the corresponding components. As expected there
are two opposing terms which allows us to nd the minimum reduction in the marginal
costs as a fraction of the price that ensures a nonincrease of post-merger prices, that is
"0 = (1  M)E0 =  MD12
1+D12
> 0: This threshold is increasing in the pre-merger margin
and in the diversion ratio. Then and since the diversion ratio is decreasing in the degree
of di¤erentiation, a lower synergy would be required to clear a horizontal merger when
composite goods are very di¤erentiated.
Focusing on each component price e¤ects, we have that
pHs pI
pI
= (2 +D12)[ M D12(3+D12)(1+D12)  
(1 M)E
(3+D12)
]
qHs qI
qI
= (1 +D12)[M
D12
(3+D12)(1+D12)
+ (1 M)E
(3+D12)
]
: (3)
It is interesting to see that the UPPI for the composite good price is explained by op-
posing e¤ects on the di¤erent component prices. The horizontal merger has an upward
e¤ect on ps while there is a downward e¤ect on qs absent synergies. Also regarding the
pass-through rates the horizontal merger has a negative e¤ect on ps while the e¤ect is
positive on qs. Since the e¤ect derived from ps is a direct e¤ect it dominates the induced
have used elasticities to measure reasonable interchangeability. In fact, it is stated that by 1995, the
DOJ was using the term diversion ratioto capture this same concept in a more intuitive way.
20It can be easily shown that in a composite good industry the diversion ratio for the general case with
n components of the same type is   n+(n2 n 1) :
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e¤ect on qs so the nal UPPI follows the same pattern than the e¤ect on ps.
The UPPI for a regular good industry
Now we are interested in nding whether the upward pricing pressure of a horizon-
tal merger is higher when the market is characterized by composite goods or by regular
goods. In order to make the comparison properly we have to consider the same utility
function as before and also to eliminate the possibility that consumers choose about com-
ponents. Thus the representative consumer maximizes utility noting that only products
X11 and X22 will be available. The simplest way to do it is to assume away compatibility
between components of the same type and also consider that there are only two rms,
each producing one component of each type. That is, rm 1 produces components A1 and
B1 while rm 2 produces components A2 and B2, therefore only two products are sold
provided incompatibility, that is X11 and X22; as required. We solve the model for the
pre-merger situation and when both rms 1 and 2 merge, where of course only horizontal
mergers make sense. Denote by sI and by sHs the equilibrium prices pre-merger and post-
merger when e¢ ciencies are resulting after the merger. Also denote by D12 and M the
corresponding diversion ratios and initial price margins, where it turns out that D12 =
 

and M = s
I 2c
sI
= (1+
D12)( 2c)
(1+ D12)+2c
: Therefore the UPPI corresponding to the regular good
industry is 21
sHs   sI
sI
=   M
D12
2(1 + D12)
  (1 
M)E
2
: (4)
Where the minimum reduction in the marginal costs as a fraction of the price that en-
sures a non-increase of post-merger prices, that is "0 = (2c E
0
sI
) = (1  M) E0 =   M D12
1+ D12
> 0:
Comparison between UPPIs
First of all it is important to comment that the diversion ratio for composite goods
is greater (in absolute terms) than that of the regular good industry, D12 > D12: The
reason is that an increase in one component price a¤ects two composite goods. Thus the
opportunity cost of that price increase in terms of sales in favor of the other component of
21We dene the diversion ratio with its sign and not in absolute value as in Farrell and Shapiro (2010).
From their equation number 7, using symmetry and the denition of M, the expression in the text is
obtained.
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the same type is higher as compared with the regular product market. Secondly, the price
margin ratio for the composite good market is greater than that of the regular market,
M > M: Therefore, four independent rms in a composite good market have more market
power than a duopoly in a regular market. Note that higher diversion ratios and higher
price margin ratios are conditions that tend to increase the upward pricing pressure after
the merger. Thus as products become more substitutes the pressure on prices increases
and this is true for both type of goods.
Thirdly, the following proposition is reached:
Proposition 3: A greater marginal cost saving is required for a horizontal merger in
a composite good industry not to increase prices as compared with a horizontal merger in
a regular good industry. In other words, E0 > E0:
The above result is useful for antitrust authorities since it advises them to be more
demanding when dealing with horizontal mergers in composite goods industries. Note that
this di¤erence is rooted to the higher diversion ratio and margin that arises in composite
good industries.
Finally, to compare the two UPPIs just note that horizontal mergers in composite good
industries are less e¤ective in passing e¢ ciencies derived from the merger to consumers,
since pass-through rates are larger for regular good industries, that is (1 M)E
2(3+D12)
< (1 
M)E
2
.
Also and in case of no realized e¢ ciencies after the merger, that is for E = 0; an interesting
result is that the comparison among UPPIs is not univocal and depends on the degree
of product di¤erentiation and on the size of the 
c
ratio. In particular, the UPPI in
composite-good industries is greater if and only if 
c
> +
  : A su¢ cient condition is that
the UPPI in composite-good industries is greater for all 
c
if 

< 1
3
.
4 Conclusions
This paper studies merging behavior in a composite good industry allowing rms to choose
the type of partner, either a complementary or a substitute component producer. Previous
analysis has focused on just one type of merger and papers on composite goods have
considered only the possibility of complementary mergers. We nd that complementary
mergers arise at equilibrium only when composite goods are very di¤erentiated, while
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horizontal mergers are preferred otherwise. A simple policy implication is derived: a
complementary merger will be always allowed by antitrust authorities under any standard,
either the consumer surplus or the social welfare one, while a horizontal merger will
never be when only strategic e¤ects are taken into account. Therefore, we identify a
market failure since horizontal mergers when proposed are never allowed. This never
happens in case a complementary merger is proposed. Another interesting advise for
antitrust authorities is that if they receive notications of complementary mergers when
products are close substitutes, they should conclude that some e¢ ciencies are associated
to complementary mergers since they would not otherwise be proposed.
Notice that horizontal mergers are commonly proposed and usually accepted in case
there is no substantial lessening of competition or the merger is a necessary condition to
achieve e¢ ciency gains. Since the particular model presented focuses on a highly concen-
trated industry, we resort to considering e¢ ciency e¤ects linked to horizontal mergers to
check the conditions antitrust authorities should impose to clear them. To tackle this issue
we consider the new approach to assess horizontal mergers incorporated in the Horizontal
Merger Guidelines issued in 2010. This new approach based on the upward price pressure
index to evaluate unilateral e¤ects of a merger takes into account, on the one hand, the
diversion ratio and the pre-merger margin and, on the other, the pass-through rate. We
nd that both the diversion ratio and the pre-merger margin are greater in a composite
good industry, compared to a regular good industry. Thus, despite being counter intuitive,
rmsmarket power is greater in a four-rm composite good industry than in a standard
duopoly of a regular good. The pass-through rate, however, is lower in a composite good
industry. An important result is that the marginal cost saving required for a horizontal
merger in order not to increase prices is greater in a composite good industry than in a
regular good one. Antitrust authorities should request, therefore, higher savings levels in
the case of horizontal mergers in composite good markets.
It will be interesting to study in future research e¢ ciency e¤ects when components
can give some utility to consumers by themselves, not only if they are combined and used
inside a composite good. Moreover, a policy maker can be incorporated to the model, to
study the implications of a policy aimed to make rms reduce post-merger prices or to
subsidize rms involved in desirable mergers for the society.
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A Proofs
Consider throughout  >  and 
c
> 2:
a) Regarding the Horizontal merger (H)
 The merger is protable if HA1A2 > 2I = IA1 + IA2 : This is true if
8( 2c)2(+)(32+2)
(+3)(92 2)2 > 0; that always holds:
 Outsiders are worse o¤ after the merger, I > HB1 = HB2 : This is true if
24( 2c)2( )(+)
(+3)(92 2)2 > 0 which always holds.
 Industry prots are smaller after the merger if 

< 2
p
3  3:
Just note that 8( 2c)
2(+)(32+2)
(+3)(92 2)2 <
48( 2c)2( )(+)
(+3)(92 2)2 ; if


< 2
p
3  3:
 The merged rm prefers selling both components instead of eliminating one of them.
In case the merged rm decides not to produce A2, the demands for the two possible
composite goods X11 and X12 have to be reformulated leading to expressions: X11 =
( ) s11+s12
2 2 and X12 =
( ) s12+s11
2 2 . Finding the new equilibrium at p
He
1 = c +
( 2c)
3  < p
H
1 ; q
He
1 = q
He
2 =
( )+c(+)
3  > q
H
1 and the following prots: 
He
A1A2
=
22( 2c)2
(+)(3 )2 . Remind that 
H
A1A2
= 4( 2c)
2(+)2
(3+)2(+3)
: Finding that HA1A2 > 
He
A1A2
always.
b) Regarding the C merger
 The new rm will only sell the bundle when composite goods are not very di¤erenti-
ated (i.e. for 

> 0:6653); otherwise mixed bundling arises at equilibrium.
a) First solve for the case of mixed bundling.
Under mixed bundling, the new rm selects three prices p1; q1 and the bundle price
sb; where at equilibrium, sb < p1 + q1 = s11. The demand system must be reformulated
substituting s11 for sb, as now composite good A1B1 is only demanded as a bundle.
Equilibrium prices and outputs, where superscript C denotes complementary merger
under mixed bundling, are:
Prices Outputs
Merged rm
sC

b =
( )(3+5)+2c(+)(3+)
2(32+3 22)
pC

1 = q
C
1 =
(+c)(+) 2( c)2
(32+3 22)
XC

11 =
( 2c)(3+)(+2)
2(+3)(32+3 22)
Outsiders pC

2 = q
C
2 =
( )(+)+c(+3)
(32+3 22) X
C
22 =
( 2c)(22+5+52)
2(+3)(32+3 22)
Mix-and-match XC

12 = X
C
21 =
( 2c)(22+3 2)
2(+3)(32+3 22)
Prots read C

A1B1
= ( 2c)
2( )(+2)(172+30+2)
4(+3)(32+3 22)2 and
C

A2
= C

B2
= 2( 2c)
2( )(+)3
(+3)(32+3 22)2 .
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b) Consider now the case where the new rm will only sell the bundle:
Only two composite goods can be purchased by consumers, the bundle sold by the
merged rm and X22: The merged entity selects sb and each of the component producers
select component prices p2 and q2; respectively. Solving for the equilibrium prices we ob-
tain for the merged rm the following equilibrium variables: sC
+
b =
( )(3+2)+2(3+)c
2(32 2) ;
XC
+
11 =
( 2c)(3+2)
2(+)(32 2) and 
C+
A1B1
= ( 2c)
2( )(32+22)
4(+)(32 2)2
Similarly for outsiders, pC
+
2 = q
C+
2 =
( )(2+)+2(+)c
2(32 2) ; X
C+
22 =
( 2c)(2+)
2(+)(32 2) and
C
+
A2
= C
+
B2
= ( 2c)
2( )(+)3
4(+)(32 2)2 :
By comparing C
+
A1B1
and C

A1B1
we nd that C

A1B1
> C
+
A1B1
i¤ 

< 0:665:
 Industry prots decrease after the merger i¤ 0:129 <  < 0:750:
+First note that the merger is protable:
-for 

< 0:665; we check C

A1B1
> IA1 + 
I
B1
, that is equivalent to
( 2c)2( )(95+424 5832 4423+1774 625)
4(+3)(93+62 92+23)2 > 0 and always holds:
-for 

> 0:665; we check C
+
A1B1
> IA1 + 
I
B1
i¤ 

> 0:604:
Therefore the merger is always protable.
+Second; outsiders are worse o¤ after the merger i¤ 

< 0:908,
-we check IA2 = 
I
B2
> C

A2
= C

B2
for 

< 0:665; this is equivalent to
2( 2c)2( )2(+)(62+5 32)
(+3)(93+62 92+23)2 > 0; and it always holds:
- we check IA2 = 
I
B2
> C
+
A2
= C
+
B2
for 

> 0:665; which holds i¤ 

< 0:908
+Finally
- we check C

A1B1
+2C

A2
< 4I for 

< 0:665: The inequality holds i¤ 

2 [0:129; 0:809]
- we check C
+
A1B1
+ 2C
+
A2
< 4I for

> 0:665; the inequality holds i¤ 

< 0:750:
Which proves the above claim.
c) Proof of Proposition 1.
We compare HA1A2 > 
C
A1B1
: Note that (   2c)2 does not a¤ect the sign of the
inequality and normalize  = 1; therefore  2 (0; 1): Thus from HA1A2   CA1B1 > 0; the
next expression  9+78+166
2+43 54+225
4(3+)2( 3 3+22)2 ; is reached which is negative for 0 <  < 0:0958
and positive otherwise:
Similarly, we nd that HA1A2   C
+
A1B1
> 0 for all  2 (0; 1): Thus Proposition1 holds.
d) Proof of Proposition 2.
First, we provide the CS and SW corresponding to each possible merger and the initial
situation:
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CSI = 2( 2c)
2(+)2
(3 )2(+3) ; CS
H = 2( 2c)
2(+)2
(3+)2(+3)
;
CSC

= ( 2c)
2(214+833+10522+493 24)
8(+3)(32+3 22)2 when


< 0:665;
and CSC
+
= ( 2c)
22(132+15+42)
8(+)(32 2)2 for


> 0:665:
SW I = 2( 2c)
2(5 3)(+)
(3 )2(+3) ; SW
H = 2( 2c)
2(5+)(+)
(3+)2(+3)
;
SWC

= ( 2c)
2(874+2413+9922 1333 384)
8(+3)(32+3 22)2 when


< 0:665;
and SWC
+
= ( 2c)
2(473+212 242 123)
8(+)(32 2)2 for


> 0:665:
Social Welfare.
To prove that SWC

> SWH is equivalent to check whether the sign of the expression,
(635+1984+19832+423 1734 345)
8(3+)2(32+3 22)2 ; is positive and this is always true: Next SW
C >
SW I if ( 1)( 63+18+390
2+203 4554+1545)
8(3 )2(1+3)( 3 3+22)2 > 0; which is positive for 0 <  < 0:4090 and
negative otherwise: Next, SW I > SWH if 8( 2c)
2(+)(62 3 2)
(+3)(92 2)2 > 0 and this is always
true. Finally, SWC

> SWC
+
i¤
3608 + 10087 + 42062   75053   53344   12735   3326 + 657 + 388 > 0
which is the case for all  2 (0; 1):
Therefore, the highest SW is:
SWC

> SW I if 0 <  < 0:4090
SW I > SWC

if 0:4090 <  < 1
Consumer Surplus.
First to prove CSC

> CSH is equivalent to
(455+1624+30632+23623+414 225)
8(3+)2(32+3 22)2 > 0 which is always true: Next, CS
C > CSI if
( 1)( 45 90+1142+2203+594 665)
8(3 )2(1+3)( 3 3+22)2 > 0; which holds for 0 <  < 0:6259: Next, CS
I > CSH
if 24( 2c)
2(+)2
(+3)(92 2)2 > 0 and this is always true. Finally, CS
C > CSC
+
i¤
728 + 2887 + 48062 + 57053 + 41344   1735   16326   457 + 28 > 0
which is the case for all  2 (0; 1).
Therefore, the highest CS is
CSC

> CSI if 0 <  < 0:6259
CSI > CSC

if 0:6259 <  < 1
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